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DEVELOPMENT AID IN AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT: USING 
MICROFINANCE TO PROMOTE 
EQUITABLE AND SUSTAINABLE WATER 
USE IN THE NILE BASIN 
Shreevani Suvarna*
Abstract: Water resource management plays a critical role in everything 
from the viability of individual communities to regional political stability. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Nile Basin. The Nile Basin Ini-
tiative (NBI) is a recent effort to overcome historical clashes over use of 
the Nile’s waters in order to achieve a basin-wide framework for trans-
boundary cooperation. One element of NBI focuses on community-level 
action in furtherance of transboundary cooperation, and includes a mi-
crogrant program to help achieve its goals. Signiªcantly, however, NBI 
does not include a microcredit program. This Note argues that, in light of 
the deep connections between inadequate water resources and the mar-
ginalization of women and the poor, NBI should supplement its micro-
grant program with microcredit programs to further its goals. More 
broadly, this Note advocates for the use of microcredit programs—which 
are generally implemented only in the development aid arena—in an en-
vironmental context. 
 
 
Introduction†
 Thirty years ago, Egypt, a lower riparian of the Nile, yet a domi-
nant regional power, issued military threats against its upstream neigh-
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2005–06. 
The author dedicates this article in loving memory of her father, who ªrst opened her eyes 
to water resource management. The author extends appreciation to family, friends, and 
teachers for their unending encouragement. 
† The above logo is for the United Nations International Year of Microcredit (2005). It 
signiªes projects that further the goals of the program—increasing awareness of and inno-
vative uses for microcredit. 
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bors to prevent them from interfering with the Nile’s ºow.1 Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat stated in 1970 that “‘[t]ampering with the rights 
of a nation to water is tampering with its life; and a decision to go to 
war on this score is indisputable in the international community.’”2 In 
1988, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Minister of State Foreign Affairs, 
stated that the Nile would cause the next war in the Middle East.3 Ten-
sion over water rights continued into the Gulf War in 1991, when media 
reports suggested that Sudan was aiming missiles at the Aswan High 
Dam in Egypt.4 Although a “water war” has not yet occurred, it is essen-
tial for future social and political stability in this region that the Nile’s 
ten riparian states—Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire, Kenya, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt—achieve a cooperative scheme for 
use of the Nile’s water.5 Leaders of these states have indicated a greater 
willingness to cooperate with regard to water rights to the Nile.6
 The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), launched in 1999, provides a 
comprehensive plan for transboundary cooperation over the Nile 
River.7 The plan uses a “‘transitional arrangement’” to foster informa-
tion sharing and technical assistance as well as joint development initia-
tives until a “‘permanent legal framework’” is in place.8 Signiªcantly, 
the plan incorporates basin-, subbasin-, and community-level ap-
proaches to promoting transboundary cooperation, and recognizes the 
connection between economic and environmental issues.9 For exam-
                                                                                                                      
1 Eyal Benvenisti, Sharing Transboundary Resources: International Law and 
Optimal Resource Use 17 (2002). 
2 Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, The Changing Nile Basin Regime: Does Law Matter?, 
43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 105, 106 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Raj Krishna, The Legal 
Regime of the Nile River Basin, in The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East 23, 
34 ( Joyce R. Starr & Daniel C. Stoll eds., 1998)); see Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in 
the Third World: Conºict and Cooperation in International River Basins 53 
(1999) (noting that after signing the Camp David peace accord, Sadat stated that the only 
reason the country would go to war with a neighboring country would be a water-related 
dispute). 
3 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 2, at 106. 
4 Id. 
5 See Elhance, supra note 2, at 53. 
6 See Brunnée & Toope, supra note 2, at 106–07. 
7 See The World Bank Group, World Bank Group: Nile Basin Initiative, http://www. 
worldbank.org/afr/nilebasin/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
8 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 2, at 108 (quoting Nile Basin Initiative, Strategic 
Action Program Overview Document, ch. 1 (2001)). 
9 Nile Basin Initiative, Transboundary Environmental Action Project: Project Imple-
mentation Plan 5 (Working Document 2002), http://www.nileteap.org/docs/publica- 
tions/Nile_Env_PIP_no_cover.pdf [hereinafter TEAP] (working document providing an 
organizational chart detailing policy-, national-, basinwide-, and subregional-level organiza-
tional structures). 
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ple, the community-level projects in NBI include a small-grant pro-
gram.10 These grants, known as microgrants, are intended to be 
awarded to local communities to “support community-driven interven-
tions to address transboundary environmental threats on a local 
scale.”11 Distinct from microgrants are microloans—small, unsecured 
loans often given on an individual basis and a tool generally seen as 
part of development aid12—which are not an element of NBI. This 
Note argues that microcredit, when used in conjunction with existing 
strategies in international environmental law and policy, can make 
signiªcant contributions to water resource management in the develop-
ing world. 
 Part I explores the geographical, historical, and hydropolitical 
settings for conºict in the Nile Basin. The historical failure of large-
scale cooperation over water resource management in the Nile Basin, 
combined with local and regional power struggles, have contributed 
to problems of water scarcity and water-related inequities. Part II ex-
amines the cooperative framework created by NBI and details its 
funding structure. Part III describes problems arising from state con-
trol over water management practices. Part III emphasizes the value of 
a human rights approach to environmental resource management, 
and considers the implications of addressing a human right to water. 
By accepting the viability of a human rights approach to water re-
source management, one can begin to import development aid tools, 
such as microgrants, into environmental resource management. Part 
IV provides a closer look at funding structures available through the 
World Bank and other international organizations. Part V presents 
ways in which microcredit may be used in the context of water re-
source management. Although microcredit is typically viewed as de-
velopment aid for purposes of stimulating a local economy or reduc-
ing poverty, microcredit programs can be implemented for broader 
policy objectives. This Note concludes that, in light of the strong cor-
relation between poverty and environmental resources, microcredit 
can further the goals of international environmental projects in the 
developing world in general, and in the Nile Basin in particular. 
                                                                                                                      
10 Id. at 19–20. 
11 Id. at 19. 
12 Isobel Coleman, Defending Microcredit, 29 Fletcher F. World Aff. 181, 182 (2005) 
(“[D]onors should accept microªnance for what it is: not a silver bullet, but an important 
tool in the development toolkit.”); see infra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining 
the difference between microgrants and microloans). 
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I. The Nile River and Hydropolitics in the Developing World 
A. The Nile River 
 The Nile River is the world’s longest river and the lifeblood of 
Eastern Africa, providing sustenance and power for hundreds of 
thousands of people in this politically volatile region.13 The Nile has 
the largest number of riparian states in the developing world, and 
ºows through some of the youngest sovereign states in the developing 
world.14
 Africa’s colonial legacy left the continent with national borders 
that follow neither natural nor social divides.15 The ºow of the Nile’s 
water through areas of political instability and power asymmetry further 
compounds the challenges to transboundary cooperation.16 Despite 
the vastness of the Nile Basin—stretching from Lake Victoria in south-
central Africa to the Mediterranean Sea17—and the ever increasing 
need for irrigation in this region, use of the Nile’s resources is far from 
evenly distributed among the riparian states.18 For example, Ethiopia 
generates at least eighty percent of the Nile’s water, while Egypt, the 
greatest consumer of the river’s resources, contributes no water to the 
Nile.19
                                                                                                                      
13 See Elhance, supra note 2, at 60–61. 
14 Id. at 80–81. 
15 Claudia W. Sadoff et al., The World Bank, Report No. 25,396, Africa’s Inter-
national Rivers: An Economic Perspective 7 (2003), available at http://www-wds.world 
bank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946_03020504012641; 
see Elhance, supra note 2, at 63. 
16 See Elhance, supra note 2, at 62–66. 
17 Id. at 54. The basin area comprises a total area of 3 million square kilometers. Peter 
Rogers, International River Basins: Pervasive Unidirectional Externalities, in The Economics of 
Transnational Commons 35, 59 (Partha Dasgupta et al. eds., 1997). The main body of the 
Nile is primarily composed of two parts: the Blue Nile, which drains Lake Tana; and the 
White Nile, which originates in Lake Victoria and feeds the Sudanese swamps known as the 
Sudd. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 2, at 117. The two tributaries meet in Khartoum. Id. 
18 See Elhance, supra note 2, at 56; Brunnée & Toope, supra note 2, at 117; Rogers, su-
pra note 17, at 59 (“[T]he existing treaties and effectively all of the water consumption 
occur in the two downstream riparians which essentially make no contribution to the river 
ºow.”). 
19 Ashok Swain, The Nile River Basin Initiative: Too Many Cooks, Too Little Broth, 22 SAIS 
Rev. of Int’l Aff. 293, 298 (2002), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/ 
v022/22.2swain.pdf; see Kristin Wiebe, Student Writing, The Nile River: Potential for Conºict 
and Cooperation in the Face of Water Degradation, 41 Nat. Resources J. 731, 734 (2001) 
(“More than 97 percent of Egypt’s freshwater emanates from the Nile”). 
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 The Nile Basin has a history of recorded agricultural settlement 
reaching back at least six thousand years.20 The centrality of the Nile 
Basin to Africa’s agriculture and development is evident in long-
standing efforts to harness and control the Nile’s waters21 to serve the 
needs of over 250 million people.22 However, frequent droughts, and 
uneven or unpredictable rainfall, makes the ºow of the Nile’s water 
inconsistent: twenty percent of the Nile’s total discharge is spread out 
over nine months, while the remaining eighty percent occurs during 
August, September, and October.23
 These geographic features contribute to the incentive for each ri-
parian state to increase its access to and control of the Nile’s water.24 
This desire for dominance over the Nile’s water is evident, for example, 
in Egypt’s construction of the Aswan High Dam.25 While the Aswan 
High Dam has provided some beneªts to Egypt, its impact on the Basin 
as a whole has not been universally positive, as it “‘has kept the river 
from ºooding and depositing renewing sediment . . . . The delta has 
instead been inundated with catastrophic superlatives: It is among the 
world’s most densely cultivated lands, with one of the world’s highest 
uses of fertilizers and highest levels of soil salinity.’”26 As agriculture, 
development, and population in Africa grow, demand for the Nile’s 
water far exceeds available resources for all of the riparian states, ren-
dering historical forms of noncooperative, unstable, and inequitable 
water uses unsustainable.27
                                                                                                                      
20 John Waterbury, Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley 12 (1979); Rogers, supra 
note 17, at 59. 
21 Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Land & Water Dev. Div., Irrigation Po-
tential in Africa: A Basin Approach, at ch. 6, FAO Land and Water Bulletin No. 4 (1997), 
available at http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_ªle=/docrep/w4347e/w4347e 
0k.htm; see U.N. Educ., Scientiªc & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], The Nile: Moving Beyond 
Cooperation, at 10–12, U.N. Doc. SC-2003/WS/61 (2003) (prepared by Alan Nicol). 
22 Christina M. Carroll, Note, Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin, 12 
Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 269, 275 (1999). 
23 Waterbury, supra note 20, at 23; see Carroll, supra note 22, at 274–75 (1999). 
24 The Nile: Moving Beyond Cooperation, supra note 21, at 10–14. 
25 Waterbury, supra note 20, at 30. 
26 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 2, at 119 (quoting Peter Theroux, The Imperiled Nile 
Delta, Nat’l Geographic, Jan. 1997, at 2, 8). 
27 See Elhance, supra note 2, at 59. 
[T]he minimum per capita water needs for an efªcient, moderately industri-
alized nation have been estimated as 1,000 cubic meters per year, the annual 
per capita water availability between the years 1990 and 2025 is expected to 
drop from 1,070 to 620 cubic meters in Egypt, from 2,360 to 980 cubic meters 
in Ethiopia, from 590 to 190 cubic meters in Kenya, from 880 to 350 cubic 
meters in Rwanda, and from 2,780 to 900 cubic meters in Tanzania, based 
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B. History of the Use of and Conºict over the Nile’s Water 
 Despite the importance of the Nile Basin to its riparian states, 
cooperation among these states has been a historical challenge.28 Not 
only did Africa’s colonial legacy impose unnatural state borders along 
the Nile’s anfractuous path, it also set the stage for the Nile to be a 
ºashpoint for conºict in the post-colonial period.29
 In the colonial period, Great Britain effectively controlled the 
entire Nile through its military dominance in Africa and its political 
control of Egypt, Sudan, and the three upper riparian states on the 
White Nile.30 Colonial-era treaties ensured that no projects could be 
built in the Nile Basin, and that no upstream Nile water could be 
withdrawn without Egyptian and British consent.31 Control over the 
Nile was an essential part of British colonial strategy.32 This control 
was also the key to Egypt’s own viability, because Egypt, despite its 
military power, is vulnerable due to its heavy reliance on the Nile for 
water and position as a lower riparian.33
 Colonial-era tensions carried over into the post-colonial period, 
creating a regime in the Nile Basin that was, until recently, properly 
characterized as one of open conºict.34 Remnants of colonial-era 
agreements compound the problems presented by already existing 
asymmetries in information, gaps in science and uncertainty about 
technical matters, ineffective means of enforcement, claims of sover-
eignty and superior rights, domestic and international conºicts in in-
terest, and the upstream-downstream dynamic.35 The process of de-
                                                                                                                      
solely on the anticipated increases in the respective populations and on the 
current rates of water extraction. 
Id. 
28 See id. at 66–67. 
29 See Brunnée & Toope, supra note 2, at 122. 
30 Elhance, supra note 2, at 68. 
31 Id.; Carroll, supra note 22, at 276. For a list of all treaty arrangements regarding the 
Nile, see Rogers, supra note 17, at 62–63 tbl.3.5. 
32 See Elhance, supra note 2, at 68–70. 
33 Id. at 54. “No other country in the world is so dependent on the water of a single 
river that it shares with not two or three but eight other states, all located upstream from 
Egypt.” Id. (citations omitted). 
34 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 2, at 105. 
35 Richard E. Just & Sinaia Netanyahu, International Water Resource Conºicts: Experience 
and Potential, in Conºict and Cooperation on Trans-boundary Water Resources 1, 9 
(Richard E. Just & Sinaia Netanyahu eds., 1998). 
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termining the rights of the riparian states to use the Nile’s water has 
therefore been quite contentious.36
II. The Nile Basin Initiative as a Framework for Cooperation 
Among Basin States 
A. Origins of the Nile Basin Initiative 
 In 1999, all of the Nile Basin riparians, except for Eritrea, signed 
NBI, the ªrst basin-wide agreement regarding the Nile River.37 NBI’s 
goal is “to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through 
the equitable utilization of, and beneªt from, the common Nile Basin 
resources.”38 NBI resulted from efforts, ongoing since the early 1990s, 
to promote greater regional cooperation and information sharing.39 
Earlier efforts to develop a basin-wide agreement for the use of the 
Nile’s water include the Hydromet Project in the late 1960s40 and the 
Technical Committee for the Promotion of the Development and En-
vironmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE) in the early 
1990s.41
 For many years, the Nile riparian states have been caught in a vi-
cious cycle in which “much-needed regional cooperation and economic 
development will not materialize without political stability in the basin, 
and political stability will remain elusive without regional cooperation 
and equitable economic development.”42 Contemporary attitudes to-
ward equitable water allocation and transboundary cooperation in the 
Nile Basin, as reºected by the beginning of NBI, give hope that the Nile 
riparian states can instead enter a different cycle, in which a “broader 
integration of regional development in turn strengthens the relation-
ships between the countries sharing international rivers, which further 
                                                                                                                      
36 See Swain, supra note 19, 296–99; The Nile: Moving Beyond Cooperation, supra note 21, 
at 15–16. 
37 Wiebe, supra note 19, at 732. Eritrea is participating in NBI as an observer. The Nile: 
Moving Beyond Cooperation, supra note 21, at 3. 
38 TEAP, supra note 9, at 1 (emphasis omitted). 
39 See Carroll, supra note 22, at 297–98. 
40 Ashok Swain, Managing the Nile River: The Role of Sub-Basin Co-operation, in Conºict 
Management of Water Resources 145, 154–55 (Manas Chatterji et al. eds., 2002). The 
Hydromet Project, launched in 1967, was ultimately unsuccessful in securing basin-based 
arrangements beyond the existing unstable agreement that existed between Egypt and 
Sudan. Id. 
41 Id. at 155. The TECCONILE program created the momentum that ultimately led to 
the creation of NBI. Id. 
42 Elhance, supra note 2, at 62. 
456 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:449 
reinforces cooperation.”43 Designed to be a transitional arrangement 
moving from planning to action, NBI focuses on fostering dialogue, 
information exchange, and technology assistance as well as creating 
joint development initiatives in furtherance of transboundary goals.44 
The beneªts of regional cooperation under NBI involve not only en-
hanced environmental sustainability and increased economic produc-
tivity in areas such as food and energy production, but also extend to 
coordinated development and integration.45
 NBI is not a panacea; it can easily be criticized for not going far 
enough to achieve its goals in the Nile Basin.46 Moreover, some have 
criticized NBI as embodying a strategy in which consensus of all of the 
riparian states is obtained early on by dealing only with less difªcult 
issues and delaying controversial issues.47 Much remains to be seen 
with respect to NBI’s impact and long-term success.48 At the very least, 
efforts to achieve consensus through NBI mark a historic moment of 
willingness to cooperate on a basin-wide scale.49
B. Organization of the Nile Basin Initiative 
 One of NBI’s primary functions is implementation of the Strate-
gic Action Program, which consists of two subprograms: the Shared 
Vision Program and the Subsidiary Action Program.50 The Shared 
Vision Program has approximately $130 million in funding for seven 
main projects focused on grant-based activities for engendering trust 
and cooperation while encouraging an environment for investment.51
 One Shared Vision Program project, the Nile Transboundary En-
vironmental Action Project (Nile TEAP), supports development of a 
“basin-wide framework for actions to address high-priority trans-
boundary environmental issues within the context of the Nile Basin 
Initiative’s . . . Strategic Action Program.”52 Although Nile TEAP is a 
part of NBI’s Shared Vision Program, it has more speciªcally deªned 
                                                                                                                      
43 Praful C. Patel, Foreword to Sadoff et al., supra note 15, at vii, vii. 
44 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 2, at 108. 
45 Patel, supra note 43, at vii. 
46 See The Nile: Moving Beyond Cooperation, supra note 21, at 28. 
47 Swain, supra note 19, at 306. 
48 See The Nile: Moving Beyond Cooperation, supra note 21, at 27–28. 
49 See The World Bank Group, supra note 7. 
50 TEAP, supra note 9, at 4; Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project, About 
Nile Basin Initiative, http://www.nileteap.org/aboutNBI.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2006) 
[hereinafter About NBI]. 
51 See TEAP, supra note 9, at 108. 
52 Id. at 1. 
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objectives, such as enhancing basin-wide cooperation and environ-
mental awareness and providing a forum for stakeholder participa-
tion.53 In order to achieve its objectives, Nile TEAP focuses on com-
ponent activities ranging from institutional to grassroots efforts.54 
This Note focuses on the Nile Transboundary Microgrants Program, 
one of the community-level projects under Nile TEAP.55
III. Linking Development Aid Strategies and Environmental 
Protection: A Human Rights Perspective 
 Although the participation of the Nile riparian states is a 
signiªcant achievement, it does not guarantee that the Nile’s water will 
be used sustainably and equitably both across and within each riparian 
state.56 To achieve truly equitable and sustainable uses of the Nile’s wa-
ter—an essential component to achieving transboundary coopera-
tion—the international community must recognize that dramatic dis-
parities and inequities exist regarding access to water rights within each 
riparian state, and that “water is critical for sustainable development, 
including environmental integrity and the eradication of poverty and 
hunger, and is indispensable for human health and well being.”57
A. Domestic and Basin-Wide Heterogeneity and Achieving Collective Action 
 The fact that the Nile riparian states are heterogeneous in ideol-
ogy, economy, ethnicity, religion, and geography is in part responsible 
for the challenges encountered in achieving a cooperative frame-
work.58 Differing priorities in water management procedures and dif-
fering levels of commitment and concern toward a basin-wide initia-
tive add further challenges to the prospect of basin-wide 
cooperation.59 The heterogeneity of the Nile riparian states thus es-
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 10–12, tbl.1. These component activities are “1. Institutional Strengthening to 
Facilitate Regional Cooperation. 2. Community-level Land, Forest and Water Conserva-
tion. 3. Environmental Education and Awareness. 4. Wetlands and Biodiversity Conserva-
tion. [And] 5. Water Quality Monitoring Basin-wide.” Id. at 10. 
55 Id. at 11, tbl.1; see also discussion infra Part IV.B. 
56 See G.A. Res. 58/217, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/217 (Feb. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.unesco.org/water/water_celebrations/decades/water_for_life.pdf (stating that 
to achieve water related goals, a greater focus on water related issues and continued coopera-
tion on all levels is necessary). 
57 Id. See generally TEAP, supra note 9, 18–22 (discussing the rationale for both commu-
nity-level and basin-wide projects). 
58 Elhance, supra note 2, at 63. 
59 Swain, supra note 40, at 155–56. 
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sentially precludes the possibility that the riparian states will easily 
agree on a principle or set of principles of water allocation.60
 The Nile River Basin Transboundary Environmental Analysis, 
initiated in 1999 as part of NBI, was created to “help translate existing 
national environmental commitments and interests into regional and 
basin-wide analytical frameworks, priorities and, eventually, basin-wide 
actions.”61 NBI has essentially created a basin-wide basis for dialogue 
involving the participation of the Nile’s riparian states.62 Participation 
of each riparian state in a basin-wide dialogue, however, does not en-
sure the protection of all important domestic interests or peoples 
within each state.63 Domestic interest groups often present an obsta-
cle to regional cooperation due to small-group domination.64 Protec-
tionist policies and the “willful burdening of domestic groups by other 
groups who abuse the inherent ºaws that exist in the domestic politi-
cal processes of states” make even domestic consensus a challenge.65 
Thus, a major challenge in the institutional framework established by 
NBI is addressing the fact that the Nile riparian states are tremen-
dously heterogeneous on a domestic level, yielding a signiªcant po-
tential for distorted governmental choices that may, and often do, ne-
glect the interests of certain beneªciaries of ecosystem preservation.66
 Protecting human interests on a domestic level is deeply con-
nected with transboundary management of water resources because 
environmental degradation unquestionably poses a threat to human 
health and human life.67 By 2025, between ªve and six Nile Basin 
                                                                                                                      
60 David Goldberg, World Bank Policy on Projects on International Waterways in the Context 
of Emerging International Law and the Work of the International Law Commission, in The Peace-
ful Management of Transboundary Resources 153, 163 (Gerald H. Blake et al. eds., 
1995) (noting that Egypt has an interest in following the “no appreciable harm” rule with 
regard to use of the Nile’s water, whereas Ethiopia, because of its upper riparian status, has 
an interest in following the principle of equitable use, and thereby asserting a claim to 
increased use of the Nile’s water). 
61 TEAP, supra note 9, at 1 (emphasis added). 
62 See id. at 2. 
63 See Benvenisti, supra note 1, at 12–13 (“Most governments have tended to play 
down the interests of minorities, especially indigenous groups. . . . Disrespect for human 
rights and minority cultures has also been strongly associated with national management 
of water and other natural resources.”). 
64 Id. at 101. 
65 Id. at 11; see id. at 127–28. 
66 See id. at 19–20. 
67 See Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implica-
tions, 5 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1992); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environ-
mental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 Stan. J. Int’l L. 103, 104 (1991). 
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countries will be considered water scarce.68 How well the Nile riparian 
states stave off the potentially catastrophic consequences of water 
shortage will dramatically impact not only the political stability but 
also the quality of life in this part of the developing world.69 NBI’s 
goals recognize this relationship and include a directive “to promote 
economic development and ªght poverty throughout the basin.”70
 Collective action should focus on the positive human relationship 
with the Nile, but it must consider the temptation to use the Nile’s 
water as a “water weapon” in a politically unstable climate.71 The po-
tential for inadequate protection of minorities and future generations 
demands that collective action in the Nile Basin adequately address 
the needs of underrepresented domestic populations; adopting a 
human rights perspective in the transboundary management of the 
Nile’s water is an essential part of doing so.72
B. Water as a Human Right 
 Adopting a human rights perspective in environmental protection 
in general, and in the allocation of water rights in the Nile Basin in par-
ticular, involves recognizing “that environmental rights also means 
rights for humans.”73 Speciªcally, a human rights perspective in envi-
ronmental issues supports the belief that humans have a right to a 
healthy environment, and that, as a matter of basic human rights, “in-
dividuals have certain entitlements in relation to the environment.”74 
Application of this view requires identiªcation of groups most com-
                                                                                                                      
68 The Nile: Moving Beyond Cooperation, supra note 21, at 2. 
69 Sadoff et al., supra note 15, at 55 (“To a greater extent in Africa than anywhere 
else in the world, international rivers have the potential to join countries economically and 
politically—or, conversely, to cause economic and political tensions between them.”). 
70 TEAP, supra note 9, at 1. 
71 See Benvenisti, supra note 1, at 12; McCaffrey, supra note 67, at 6. For example, his-
torically controversial Jonglei Canal Project was planned to divert the Nile’s waters before 
reaching the Sudd marshes region in Sudan as a way to draw more water from Sudan into 
Egypt as part of a water sharing agreement between the two states. Benvenisti, supra note 
1, at 14. The plan, however, would divert water away from people in the Jonglei region, 
who oppose the project because they rely on agriculture and aquaculture for their liveli-
hood. Id. 
72 See infra Part III.B. 
73 See Dennis deLeon, The Merger of Human Rights and Environmental Law, in The Role 
of Law in the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: 
Presentations and Papers 19, 23 (1992). 
74 J. G. Merrills, Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual Aspects, in Hu-
man Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection 25, 25 (Alan E. Boyle & Mi-
chael R. Anderson eds., 1998). 
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monly disadvantaged in society: minorities and future generations.75 
Because attention to future generations is an accepted principle of sus-
tainable development, national and international law as well as interna-
tional development institutions have validated the principle of inter-
generational equality as a normative concept in environmental 
protection.76 Indeed, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment states that: “[t]o de-
fend and improve the human environment for present and future gen-
erations has become an imperative goal for mankind—a goal to be pur-
sued together with, and in harmony with, the established and 
fundamental goals of peace and of worldwide economic and social de-
velopment.”77
 Less explicitly addressed in the international dialogue on envi-
ronmental protection is recognition that protection of minority inter-
ests is necessarily linked to ecosystem management.78 A growing num-
ber of scholars and nongovernmental organizations79 recognize the 
undeniable link between ecosystem preservation and the enjoyment 
of fundamental human rights.80 Others, however, criticize the inclu-
sion of human needs in an environmental framework as unnecessarily 
anthropocentric.81 In practice, most human rights instruments as well 
as global and regional tribunals fail to make explicit the connection 
between human rights and environmental rights.82
 Human rights law may be one method to encourage govern-
ments to manage water resources in a way that ensures sustainability.83 
                                                                                                                      
75 Benvenisti, supra note 1, at 116. 
76 See id. at 116–20. 
77 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16, 1972, 
Declaration, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 ( June 16, 1972), available at http://www.unep. 
org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503. 
78 See Benvenisti, supra note 1, at 120–21 (“[O]nly a few references in existing na-
tional constitutions and international human rights conventions link[] human rights and 
ecosystem management. . . . [T]he 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses . . . missed a golden opportunity to 
make a strong commitment to the human rights aspect.”). 
79 See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 1; Linking Human Rights and the Environment 
(Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003); McCaffrey, supra note 67. 
80 See generally Catherine Redgwell, Life, the Universe and Everything: A Critique of Anthro-
pocentric Rights, in Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, supra 
note 74, at 71, 71–87. 
81 See generally id. 
82 Dinah Shelton, The Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribu-
nals, in Linking Human Rights and the Environment, supra note 79, at 1, 11–12; see 
supra note 78. 
83 McCaffrey, supra note 67, at 24. 
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Although the international legal framework does not address individ-
ual rights to a sustainable environment in explicit terms, a human 
right to water may be inferred from well-recognized provisions of in-
ternational law.84 The view that humans have a right to water is par-
ticularly relevant in the case of the Nile Basin, where issues of water 
scarcity relate to both an absolute shortage of water, and the use of 
water allocation as a method of subordinating certain populations to 
others in politically unstable states.85 Quite often, governments mar-
ginalize the interests of minorities—usually indigenous groups—in 
national resource management strategies.86 Effective management of 
the Nile and other rivers as a transboundary resource therefore re-
quires a system in which attention is given not only to the obstacles of 
international cooperation, but also to the resolution of domestic in-
equities. Ultimately, in the Nile Basin as elsewhere, human rights can-
not be protected without preservation of the environment, and envi-
ronmental goals cannot be furthered without attention to the impact 
of environmental resource scarcity on human rights.87
IV. Funding Community Level Action: Microgrants and 
Microloans 
 Economic programs for environmental purposes frequently focus 
either on costly large-scale projects or on small-grant funded localized 
actions.88 One part of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)—the Nile Trans-
boundary Microgrants Program (Nile TMP)—focuses on using com-
munity-based economic infusions through small grants to promote 
                                                                                                                      
84 See id. at 12. 
85 See id. at 2. 
These problems are especially acute in arid regions where there is barely 
enough water for all, even if allocated in the most equitable and efªcient way 
possible. In the ªeld of environmental law we often tend to become preoccu-
pied with questions of pollution and water quality. In many regions of the 
world the principal problem, which has not received adequate attention, is 
one of insufªcient water quantity. 
Id. 
86 Benvenisti, supra note 1, at 12. 
87 See Romina Picolotti, Agenda 21 and Human Rights: The Right to Participate, in Linking 
Human Rights and the Environment, supra note 79, at 47, 48 (“[T]he existence of a 
healthy environment becomes a condition sine qua non for the enjoyment of other basic 
human rights.”). 
88 See Elhance, supra note 2, at 74–79; Claudia M. Rogers, Water Resource Development 
and Its Effects on the Human Community: The Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, Southwestern United 
States, in Water, Culture, & Power: Local Struggles in a Global Context 123, 124 
( John M. Donahue & Barbara Rose Johnston eds., 1998). 
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broader, regional cooperation.89 Omitted from this picture, however, is 
the use of “trickle-up” microªnance programs to create local change in 
a way that enhances large-scale transboundary cooperation and pro-
motes ecosystem preservation.90
A. Large Grants and Small Grants: An Overview of Economic Development 
in Environmental Projects 
 Large-scale public-works style water projects, along with their “mas-
sive infusions of money,” are often considered “boons to economic 
progress.”91 Social scientists, however, are aware that these large-scale 
markers of economic “progress” have tremendous social, cultural, po-
litical, and behavioral repercussions that can be either positive indica-
tors of progress or negative indicators of social dominance.92
 The Aswan High Dam in the Nile Basin is an example of the 
complexities—economic, geopolitical, and environmental—that can 
accompany such large-scale projects.93 Critics of the Aswan High 
Dam—built in large part to create water security and exercise sover-
eignty in Egypt94—claim that the dam is responsible for both socio-
economic and environmental problems in the Nile Basin.95 Large-
scale projects such as the Aswan High Dam represent economic and 
environmental priorities quite different from those seen in commu-
nity-based small-grant programs.96
 There is a close relationship between economic development and 
environmental initiatives. Although many factors inºuence environ-
mental resource management, economic stability in particular is more 
likely to promote efªcient and equitable uses of environmental re-
                                                                                                                      
89 See Nile Basin Initiative, NBI-SVP Project Briefs, http://www.nilebasin.org/svpPro- 
jectBriefs.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2006); TEAP, supra note 9, at 19–20. 
90 For example, although NBI addresses poverty issues in its policy goals, and although 
the Nile TEAP focuses in part on community-level actions, neither explicitly incorporates 
microlending programs in the Nile Basin. See TEAP, supra note 9, at 2, 19–23. 
91 Rogers, supra note 88, at 124. 
92 Id. 
93 See Elhance, supra note 2, at 74–79. 
94 See id. at 76. 
95 Id. at 78. The Aswan Dam signiªcantly contributed to political tensions in the Nile 
Basin, largely because it was an affront to other riparian states as a means of establishing 
Egypt’s total sovereignty and dominance in the use of the Nile’s water. See id. at 74–79. To 
make matters worse, the Aswan Dam did not improve—and perhaps worsened—the issue 
of water scarcity throughout the Nile Basin due to the diversion of the Nile’s water and 
other ecological problems. See id. at 79; Brunnée & Toope, supra note 2, at 119. 
96 Elhance, supra note 2, at 74–79. 
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sources.97 Cooperative arrangements among the World Bank, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United 
Nations Environmental Programme are manifestations of this recog-
nition.98 For example, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) has 
explicitly recognized that the integration of environmental and de-
velopment initiatives is necessary to secure the cooperation of devel-
oping countries in an environmental initiative; as a result, small grants 
are frequently the most appropriate tools for funding environmental 
initiatives.99
 The GEF’s Small Grant Programme (SGP), launched in 1992, is 
perhaps the best example of institutional recognition of the correlation 
between the environment and localized development initiatives.100 The 
program operates by ªrst identifying areas where global beneªts are at 
stake—such as biodiversity, climate change, or international waters— 
and then funding programs that directly seek to preserve the global 
beneªt or redress the global harm where traditional development aid 
would not otherwise be available.101 In the Nile TMP, as is generally the 
case, communities and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), but 
not individuals, will be eligible recipients of small grants.102
 Although SGP implements widespread small-grant programs with 
the ultimate purpose of achieving sustainable environmental develop-
ment,103 microloan programs104 do not appear to be part of the strate-
gic implementation of environmental initiatives.105 This may be due to 
the doctrinal division of human rights approaches and environmental 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Sadoff et al., supra note 15, at 15–16. 
98 See Stephen A. Silard, The Global Environment Facility: A New Development in Interna-
tional Law and Organization, 28 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 607, 613–14 (1995). 
99 See id. 
100 See Global Environment Facility, The Global Environment Facility’s Small Grants 
Programme, What Does SGP Do?, http://sgp.undp.org (follow “About SGP” hyperlink; 
then follow “What does SGP do?” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 19, 2006). 
101 Global Environment Facility, The Global Environment Facility’s Small Grants Pro-
gramme, About GEF, http://sgp.undp.org (follow “About SGP” hyperlink; then follow 
“About GEF” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 19, 2006). 
102 The size of the grants and organizational requirements to receive grants indicate 
that this is the case. See TEAP, supra note 9, at 20. 
103 See Global Environment Facility, supra note 100. 
104 See infra Part IV.C (discussing microªnance). 
105 See generally TEAP, supra note 9 (deªning the scope of the Nile TMP); Grameen 
Foundation USA, Client Proªles, http://www.grameenfoundation.org/programs/client_ 
proªles/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2006) (providing example proªles of microloan borrowers, 
who tend to focus on hunger, poverty, education, and rights). 
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harm approaches to resource management.106 Additionally, micro-
grants and microloans differ both in functionality and implementation. 
B. Funding the Nile Basin Initiative and the Nile Transboundary 
Microgrants Program 
 The Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF) is a multidonor trust fund that 
was created for the purpose of ªnancing NBI activities.107 NBI, through 
the NBI Secretariat, manages the overall fund ºow and disbursements 
of GEF and NBTF monies.108 However, NBTF is currently managed by 
the World Bank.109 The Nile Transboundary Environmental Action 
Project (Nile TEAP) will be jointly supported by the UNDP and the 
World Bank and will use the NBI Secretariat for decentralized imple-
mentation of the funding process.110
 The Nile TEAP provides a total of at least $11.1 million to go to-
ward community-level land, forest, and water conservation projects.111 
In the initial stages, these projects will focus on pilot activities at se-
lected transboundary sites for the purposes of demonstrating the fea-
sibility of local-level approaches to land and water conservation.112 In 
addition to the anticipated positive local impact, these programs have 
the potential to strengthen national NGO networks as well as improve 
NGO-government collaboration.113
 A major component of the community-level land, forests, and wa-
ter conservation aspect of the Nile TEAP is the Nile TMP, which is de-
signed to “support community-driven interventions to address trans-
boundary environmental threats on a local scale.”114 Each participating 
NBI country will have a national Nile TMP.115 Using the institutional 
best practice model of SGP, “[t]he main emphasis of the Nile Trans-
boundary Microgrants will be on piloting new and promising trans-
boundary initiatives, on the development and dissemination of best 
practice and on exchanges of lessons learned in environmental and 
                                                                                                                      
106 See supra Part III.B. See generally Redgwell, supra note 80. 
107 TEAP, supra note 9, at 6. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 7. 
111 Id. at 18. GEF will supply $3.72 million, and NBTF/World Bank will supply $7.38 
million. Id. 
112 Id. 
113 TEAP, supra note 9, at 18. 
114 Id. at 19. 
115 Id. 
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natural resource management.”116 Signiªcantly, the Nile TMP is also 
aimed at discouraging overexploitation of natural resources by provid-
ing alternative sustainable livelihood opportunities to affected commu-
nities.117
 The maximum size of Nile TMP grants will be $25,000 each.118 It 
is anticipated, however, that many smaller grants will be given, with an 
average grant size of $10,000.119 Projects that fulªll the following six 
speciªc criteria will be given funding priority: 
(1) focus on transboundary environmental problems and 
sites, (2) provide for community participation in their design, 
implementation and evaluation, (3) pay attention to the 
needs of women and/or indigenous peoples and practices, 
(4) draw on local or Nile Basin scientiªc and technical re-
sources, (5) support capacity development, and (6) commu-
nicate best practices to wider audiences.120
Notably, women and women’s groups are to be given particular atten-
tion in Nile TMP decisions and activities.121
C. Microloans as a Tool for Alleviating Poverty 
 In the context of development aid, microloans differ from micro-
grants in three central ways: (1) microloans exist in smaller denomina-
tions than microgrants, and are therefore more accessible to individu-
als than microgrants; (2) microloans may be more cost-effective than 
other forms of development aid because they are loan based instead of 
grant based; and (3) individuals are more likely to use their money re-
sponsibly and for income-producing purposes when they are under an 
obligation to repay, and where group-lending enforcement mecha-
nisms exist.122 The origins of large-scale, international microªnance lay 
in the original Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.123 The founder of the 
original Grameen Bank recognized that people could break out of pov-
                                                                                                                      
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 20. 
119 TEAP, supra note 9, at 20. 
120 Id. at 19. 
121 Id. at 20. For a discussion of the importance of placing particular emphasis on in-
cluding women in such programs, see infra Part V.B.1. 
122 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 181–82, 185. 
123 See Grameen Foundation USA, About Us, http://www.grameenfoundation.org/ 
about_us/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2006). 
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erty by taking small, unsecured loans with reasonable and appropriate 
conditions for repayment, for the purposes of starting small busi-
nesses.124 The United Nations declared the year 2005 to be the Interna-
tional Year of Microcredit in recognition of the fact that microloans— 
small loans given to individuals in society who otherwise have no access 
to credit—and other forms of microªnance are valuable mechanisms 
to ªght poverty.125 Microcredit operates on the principle that those 
who have access to ªnancial institutional structures, and to credit in 
particular, are more able to account for daily needs.126 In its most fre-
quently cited examples, microcredit allows poor people—those who 
would otherwise not be “bankable”—to gain sufªcient capital in order 
to start an entrepreneurial business.127
 Microcredit programs emerged from widespread criticism of tradi-
tional “trickle-down” style funding programs that were State-dominated 
efforts.128 The increasing popularity of microcredit as a tool for alleviat-
ing poverty is aptly summarized in a UN resolution passed in 1997: 
[M]icrocredit programmes have proved to be an effective 
tool in freeing people from the bondage of poverty and have 
led to their increasing participation in the mainstream eco-
nomic and political process of society . . . . [The programs] 
have especially beneªted women and have resulted in the 
achievement of their empowerment in a world where more 
women than men live in absolute poverty and [where] the 
imbalance continues to grow.129
Microcredit uses a “[t]rickle-up” paradigm to energize development 
from the poorest segment of society while breaking dependency on 
                                                                                                                      
124 See id. 
125 Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, The Secretary-General Message on the 
Launch of the International Year of Microcredit (Nov. 18, 2004), http://www.yearof- 
microcredit.org/pages/mediaofªce/mediaofªce_pressreleases.asp#11182004A; see G.A. 
Res. 97, at 1, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/194 (Feb. 18, 1998) available at 
http://www.sdnpbd.org/sdi/international_days/poverty/2004/documents/a_res_52_194.
pdf. 
126 International Year of Microcredit 2005, Why a Year?—About Microªnance and Mi-
crocredit, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/pages/whyayear/whyayear_aboutmicroªnance. 
asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2006). 
127 See id. 
128 Celia R. Taylor, Microcredit as Model: A Critique of State/NGO Relations, 29 Syracuse J. 
Int’l L. & Com. 303, 313–14 (2002). 
129 G.A. Res. 97, supra note 125, at 1; Taylor, supra note 128, at 317 (quoting G.A. Res. 
97, supra note 125, at 1). 
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government handouts.130 Though it originated with small, unsecured 
loans, microªnance has grown to include a variety of ªnancial services 
for the poor, “including savings, money transfers, payment services, and 
insurance.”131
 Microcredit programs often place special emphasis on the needs 
of women for several reasons: women “often face social barriers to 
entry into the formal economy and turn to the informal sector to 
provide for themselves and their families”;132 women often engage in 
activities suitable for microloan funded enterprises;133 and the inclu-
sion of women in income-producing activity serves to empower 
them.134 Additionally, “[i]n a world where most poor people are 
women, studies have shown that access to ªnancial services has im-
proved the status of women within the family and the community.”135 
Evidence also shows that women should be targeted for microloans 
because they are more careful with family ªnances and are less likely 
than the family patriarch to spend the money for unintended pur-
poses.136 Ultimately, microªnance can play a role in female empow-
erment: it improves a woman’s ability to make decisions that affect 
her life by increasing a woman’s market access, role in family decision 
making, and participation in public action.137
 Neither microgrants nor microloans are a “silver bullet,” but each 
form of aid can play a valuable role in conjunction with other forms of 
development aid in the developing world.138 Microloans can be particu-
larly beneªcial because they are provided in much smaller amounts 
than microgrants and they focus most particularly on the “poorest of 
the poor.”139 Although both microgrant and microloan programs are 
ultimately concerned with socioeconomic development, microloan 
programs differ in that they stem from the recognition that credit, and 
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137 Id. at 185–86. 
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not just money, is necessary to combat poverty.140 Additionally, mi-
croloans can be made available to individuals, whereas microgrants on 
the scale of those given in the Nile TMP would typically require full 
community participation.141 Moreover, conditions for repayment may 
generate increased responsibility in use of given funds; thus, micro-
grants, as well as microloans in a credit-saturated environment, may not 
always be completely effective.142 As global environmental policy incor-
porates increasingly economic approaches, microloan programs are a 
logical complement, but not a substitute, to existing strategies for im-
proving sustainable environmental development; this is particularly so 
because in targeting poverty, microloans help further a variety of devel-
opment goals.143
 However, it should be noted that some commentators criticize 
microcredit and question its effectiveness.144 In particular, critics cite 
the unavailability of certain forms of quantitative data for assessment 
of microcredit, and also question the long-term effectiveness of mi-
crocredit on reducing poverty.145 Despite these criticisms, it remains 
true that “the poor, like the rich—perhaps even more so because of 
their vulnerability—beneªt substantially from the ability to smooth 
their income.”146 In turn, microcredit helps achieve development ob-
jectives beyond poverty reduction, such as improved health and nutri-
tion and increased school enrollment.147
V. Analysis 
 Microgrants are an integral part of generating community level 
action in furtherance of transboundary cooperation over the Nile’s wa-
                                                                                                                      
140 Grameen, Grameen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2006). Microloan programs can also provide other support mechanisms for 
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ter.148 Supplementing NBI’s microgrant program with a microloan pro-
gram is an important step in mitigating the effects of water scarcity in 
the Nile Basin and in other parts of the developing world.149 To achieve 
true community-level participation in water conservation and trans-
boundary cooperation, NBI must address both the connections be-
tween poverty and marginalization of minorities and women, on the 
one hand, and ecosystem preservation on the other.150 This section ad-
dresses how and why a microloan program integrated with a water-
resource oriented initiative such as NBI could play this role.151 By re-
ducing poverty and the marginalization of women and minority groups, 
a microloan program can intervene in both the causes and the conse-
quences of water scarcity.152 Microcredit is therefore central to address-
ing the three key principles of water management for the future: “1) 
equity in the form of poverty alleviation . . . , 2) preservation of natural 
resources and, . . . 3) governance.”153 Ultimately, microloans can im-
prove the human and natural environment with respect to water re-
sources, and can provide an effective local intervention where failures 
of governance exacerbate inequity and scarcity of water resources.154
A. Microcredit: A Tool to Compensate for Failures of Governance in Water 
Management 
 Africa’s water crisis, like the water crises in much of the develop-
ing world, “is one of water governance, essentially caused by the ways 
                                                                                                                      
148 See TEAP, supra note 9, at 19. 
149 See infra Part V.A–C. See generally Herbert G. Blank et al., Assessing the Impact of Agri-
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at the Fourth World Water Forum in Mexico City in 2006. Id. 
154 See infra Part V.A–C. 
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in which we mismanage water.”155 “[I]nertia at leadership level, . . . a 
world population not fully aware of the scale of the problem,” and a 
lack of empowerment continue to present dramatic obstacles to water 
resource management.156
 When examining the nature of conºict and cooperation over a 
widely shared resource such as the Nile, the tendency is to examine 
issues of state-to-state, basin-, or subbasin-level cooperation.157 NBI 
can help generate shared normative principles that lend legitimacy to 
project activities while also creating a foundation of shared principles 
at these levels.158 In Africa, however, issues of water resource man-
agement and scarcity are deeply rooted in domestic conºicts, and 
must also be addressed on a local level.159
 To a large extent, domestic tensions over water management de-
rive either from conºict between indigenous systems of water man-
agement and national interests, or from conºict among various inter-
est groups within a local system.160 While indigenous systems of water 
management in Africa vary widely, examples of indigenous water sys-
tems in Kenya and Tanzania are instructive in understanding these 
tensions.161 In Kenya and Tanzania, indigenous systems of water man-
agement were based on water ownership in the local community or a 
particular clan.162 In these cases, water is considered a free, open-
access resource for certain limited uses, with access for other uses— 
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 A further key development [in increasing cooperation in the Nile Basin] 
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162 Id. at 5. 
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particularly for the grazing of cattle—regulated by community or fam-
ily leaders.163 Communities and clans, in some instances, allowed oth-
ers to access their water and some developed reciprocal arrangements 
for resources when necessary.164
 Modern government interventions may threaten water resources 
secured under this form of community control by forcing reallocation 
of resources.165 The response of one villager in Tanzania to a request by 
the government that the village share its water aptly captures the do-
mestic tensions concerning water: “‘The people from the government 
came and said, “The water belongs to the nation, and you must share 
it.” But the villagers said “No, the water is ours” and armed themselves 
in order to ªght.’”166 The tension between communities and the state 
reºects a problem of governance over water resources because, while 
local water practices may be stable, they are not necessarily equitable.167 
In some situations, external interventions are properly warranted.168 
For example, in individual communities, women and poor people are 
generally the least able to exercise inºuence over community plan-
ning,169 yet they are often the most affected by water scarcity.170 In such 
cases, an external intervention can create a water management strategy 
that adequately accounts for the needs of those people most burdened 
by water scarcity within a given community.171 On the other hand, to-
tally decentralized water resource management inevitably allows any 
riparian community to easily draw more water than its share from a 
river, jeopardizing the access of downstream communities.172
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170 Koª A. Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Message of the Secretary-General to 
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http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/). 
171 See infra Part V.B for examples of speciªc interventions for this purpose. 
172 See Huggins, supra note 159, at 12 Box 3. Huggins provides an example of an Ox-
fam project that went awry due to insufªcient hydrological data. See id. Oxfam helped 
build a gravity-fed water scheme in a particular village, not realizing that the water source 
also fed an underground stream used by a downstream village. Id. The gravity-fed water 
scheme cut-off the downstream riparians from their water source; as a result, the down-
stream villagers destroyed the gravity-fed scheme, leaving the village that Oxfam intended 
to assist without a protected water source. Id. 
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 While in some cases state intervention can be valuable where 
community cooperation is present, state interventions into local water 
management practices can also further inequities and undermine sus-
tainable use.173 In Kenya, for example, the government encouraged the 
growth of settlements in an arid region by identifying settlement areas 
and appointing a chief who is responsible for settling the area.174 This 
responsibility gives the chief perverse incentives to engage in competi-
tive behavior with other nearby settlements and communities in order 
to attract more settlers.175 These incentives include fencing in water-
pans for grazing animals such that only settled people and their ani-
mals have access, disregarding the customary norm that prevented 
people from allowing cattle to graze too close to wells in the dry sea-
son.176 Although settlers experience many beneªts of settlement,177 the 
changing grazing patterns have resulted in overgrazing.178 The result 
has been “reduced availability of key fodder species, a situation that 
may be reversible, but is currently reducing nutrients available to herds. 
Consequently, . . . [animal] milk and meat yield is poorer, with associ-
ated human health impacts.”179
 Thus, it is not clear how external intervention in local water man-
agement should be fashioned, and whether the state should direct that 
intervention.180 At least two problems arise with advocating for state-
driven intervention. First, state interventions are likely to be fraught 
with corruption and the inºuences of domestic interest groups, result-
ing in increased marginalization of minority groups due to small-group 
capture problems.181 Second, because “[t]he decentralization of water 
resources management to the ‘lowest appropriate level,’ as advocated 
in the Dublin Principles, is one component of an ‘enabling environ-
ment’ for customary practices” there exists the risk that centralized wa-
ter resource management would jeopardize efªciency and equity by 
disabling the implementation of even sustainable indigenous prac-
tices.182 Where state intervention is not present, however, customary 
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norms of indigenous practices might not consider gender equity and 
other broader interests.183 Thus, neither indigenous practices nor state 
interventions universally solve the crisis of governance in water re-
source management; this is why “a truly community-based approach 
must be followed to create an atmosphere of negotiation and mutual 
understanding between interest groups.”184
 A community-based approach has the beneªts of increased stake-
holder participation in all aspects of water resource management, in-
cluding sanitation education, conservation, and infrastructure devel-
opment,185 while also enhancing the legitimacy of existing government 
initiatives.186 For example, NBI’s Nile TMP promotes “community-
driven interventions to address transboundary environmental threats 
on a local scale.”187 The funding available to NGOs and communities 
through the Nile TMP may be effective at promoting community-level 
projects that either directly support transboundary activities or directly 
relate to a transboundary cooperation issue.188 For instance, a micro-
grant might fund a community project to build water sanitation or irri-
gation facilities shared across a border or directly affecting a neighbor-
ing state.189
 While the microgrant program aims to generate participation 
from all aspects of a community and from women in particular,190 it 
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may not adequately reach the water-related needs or concerns of the 
most disenfranchised populations within a community. The amount of 
grant money, the application process, and the need for a community-
wide action or support factor into this inadequacy. The level of sophis-
tication of the microgrant program may itself be an obstacle for poor 
and illiterate individuals seeking out funding, whereas this may not be a 
major obstacle for uniªed communities.191 Additionally, by the terms of 
the program, microgrants will not be given for purely domestic activi-
ties that do not involve environmental issues shared by at least one 
other Nile Basin country.192 Therefore, the Nile TMP may not fully re-
alize the potential to intervene in the vicious cycle that connects social 
marginalization via status or poverty and environmental degradation.193 
Microloans can introduce improved stakeholder participation beyond 
that of microgrants in a way that will ultimately beneªt the Nile Basin as 
a whole.194 This is because microloans are speciªcally designed to tar-
get the poorest and most marginalized portions of society, and because 
microloans are available to individuals, whereas microgrants are avail-
able to communities. The following sections discuss ways in which mi-
crocredit can supplement microgrants in water management strategy 
by circumventing problems of both governance and marginalization of 
those groups most impacted by water scarcity. 
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B. Microcredit: Targeting the Connection Between Poverty, Health, and 
Environmental Stability 
1. The Links Between Poverty, Women, and Water 
 Poor countries are particularly dependent on their natural re-
sources, such as water, soil, forests, and animals, yet they are least 
equipped to protect these resources.195 Indeed, “[i]t is becoming in-
creasingly clear that water will soon become the most crucial resource 
constraint for economic development and social welfare in the arid and 
semi-arid regions of the Third World where it has not already done 
so.”196 Because water management is so crucial to economic develop-
ment, the international community must adopt the tools of economic 
development in promoting more equitable and sustainable uses of wa-
ter in the world.197 Unfortunately, only very recently have environ-
mental resources been a signiªcant part of governmental planning 
models.198
 Microcredit is currently used throughout the world—including in 
Nile basin states—”’to address the constraints that exclude people from 
full participation in the ªnancial sector.’”199 Microcredit programs are 
generally implemented with speciªc economic development goals in 
mind; this is because microcredit is ªrst and foremost a development 
aid tool.200 This section argues, however, that widespread implementa-
tion of water resource-oriented microcredit programs throughout the 
Nile Basin can alleviate both the sources and symptoms of water scar-
city,201 while also mitigating the impact of domestic tensions and ineq-
uities that can be a barrier to fully realized international coopera-
tion.202
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 In order to understand why the use of microcredit should be ex-
panded to environmental initiatives and not only be used for economic 
development programs, one must understand the connections between 
water scarcity, poverty, and the marginalization of women.203 The water 
problem in Africa is not only one of allocation; it is also one of outright 
scarcity, as there simply is not enough water to meet demand.204 Water 
scarcity has the least impact on wealthy and powerful individuals in an 
otherwise poor country because they are able to control and allocate 
water in a favorable manner.205 For example, a coffee estate in Tanzania 
held exclusive water rights for a local water source; locals had to accept 
allocation of water set out in the water rights document belonging to 
the estate.206 The farmer of the coffee estate was obligated to provide 
nearby villagers with this water as stipulated in the 1958 document.207 
Demand from nearby villagers, however, now exceeds the supply pro-
vided by the estate, and has led to arguments and in some cases vandal-
ism.208 While the estate did not itself suffer from water scarcity, the 
growing population of villagers and livestock means that nearby villag-
ers, who had little means of changing water allocation, would instead 
experience the effects of water stress.209
 The previous example illustrates the ordinary power dynamic that 
inheres in water resource allocation in the Nile Basin. This power dy-
namic is worsened by the fact that water scarcity most severely affects 
poor people because they are unable to secure a water supply.210 In 
other cases, poor people do not have adequate access to water because 
they cannot live within a reasonable distance of a water source.211 In yet 
other circumstances, water policy is used as a “punishing tool in domes-
tic politics.”212 Water scarcity generates a downward spiral of poverty 
and ill health; as a result of water scarcity, poor people “are blighted by 
the burden of water-related disease, living in degraded and often dan-
gerous environments, struggling to get an education for their children 
and to earn a living, and to get enough to eat.”213
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 Ultimately, “the poverty of a large percentage of the world’s 
population is both a symptom and a cause of the water crisis.”214 The 
developing world is currently engaged in a vicious cycle where poor 
people are most affected by water scarcity; due to their lack of re-
sources, poor communities engage in unsustainable or unsanitary wa-
ter practices.215 These practices decrease the availability of clean water 
as “short-term survival supersedes long-term resource protection.”216 
Water degradation makes it harder for people to generate water-
related livelihoods, thus ultimately generating more poverty, because 
“[w]ithout improved access to freshwater and sanitation, the overarch-
ing goal of poverty reduction cannot be achieved. The economic con-
sequences resulting from a lack of clean water and improved sanita-
tion are often underestimated.”217
 Women are disproportionately impacted by issues of water scarcity 
and cleanliness in comparison to men.218 This is due in large part to 
the fact that women typically bear the primary responsibility for house-
hold water and hygiene.219 On average, women and girls walk 3.7 miles 
every day to carry 5.3 gallons of water.220 Men, on the other hand, are 
rarely expected to walk several hours to fetch water.221 In addition to 
being responsible for water supply, women are responsible for house-
hold matters of sanitation and the use of water “for food preparation, 
care of domestic animals, crop irrigation, personal hygiene, care of the 
sick, cleaning, washing and waste disposal.”222 “Women and girls [also] 
have the greatest need for private and safe sanitation facilities” in order 
to improve health and hygiene, reduce embarrassment, and improve 
personal safety.223
 Although women play a central role in household and community 
management, their voices are often overlooked in water management 
and sanitary resource planning.224 As a result, the “impressive store of 
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environmental wisdom” developed by women on the location and na-
ture of water resources is untapped.225 The failure to use this “extensive 
traditional knowledge” not only jeopardizes the efªciency of commu-
nity water resource management and sanitary planning, it also prevents 
women from engaging in more efªcient practices with respect to do-
mestic water management, and thereby locks women out of opportuni-
ties to make money or receive an education.226
 In India, for example, the estimated national cost of women 
fetching water for home use is 150 million work days per year, which 
equals a national loss of $208 million in income.227 In addition to the 
amount of time invested in fetching water, a lack of sanitation facili-
ties often prevents girls from attending school.228 By consulting with 
women when engaging in water resource and sanitation planning, by 
building nearby water access points, and by providing private sanita-
tion facilities in schools, women will have the opportunity to make 
signiªcant ªnancial contributions to their families and communities, 
thereby reducing poverty.229 Reduced poverty ultimately yields more 
sustainable uses of water resources.230 Improved access to water gen-
erates intangible beneªts for women as well—“[w]ith closer water 
comes greater self-esteem, less harassment of women and better 
school attendance by girls.”231
2. Opportunities to Use Microcredit to Break Vicious Cycles 
 Small grants, such as those planned to be given in the Nile TMP, 
can be highly beneªcial for communities that have a collective inter-
est in promoting a particular project in furtherance of transboundary 
cooperation.232 Despite the fact that the Nile TMP places special em-
phasis on incorporating the needs of women in microgrant-funded 
projects, domestic power relationships, problems of governance, and 
cultural phenomena may prevent women and poor people from hav-
ing their needs adequately represented.233 Additionally, the number 
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of individual women and impoverished people that need help far ex-
ceeds the number of communities that will receive small grants.234
 Microloans can circumvent these problems, because in the case 
of microloans, community enablement is less vital; this is precisely why 
microloans are effective at reaching the poorest of the poor without 
distorting funds from more powerful individuals or entities.235 Addi-
tionally, microloans are well suited for stimulating income-generating 
activity by funding microenterprises.236
 Many activities funded by microloans may not have a direct rela-
tionship to water resources but will nevertheless reduce poverty, 
thereby intervening in the vicious cycle connecting poverty and in-
adequate water resources. For example, an individual can take a loan 
for as little as ªfty dollars for a small thirty-ªve millimeter camera and 
a few rolls of ªlm, and create a business taking wedding or other spe-
cial occasion photographs.237 In a more common example, an indi-
vidual could borrow money via a microloan to purchase a cellular 
phone, and then use the phone to run a small pay phone business.238 
                                                                                                                      
234 See TEAP, supra note 9, at 19–20 (addressing the scope of the Nile TMP). 
235 See U.N. Capital Dev. Fund, Basic Facts About Microªnance, http://www.uncdf.org/ 
english/microªnance/facts.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2006). 
236 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 184; Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, supra 
note 125, at 184 (“[M]icroªnance is not charity. . . . It is recognition that poor people are 
the solution, not the problem. It is a way to build on their ideas, energy, and vision. It is a 
way to grow productive enterprises, and so allow communities to prosper.”). It is not ap-
propriate, however, to provide microcredit under conditions that “pose severe challenges 
to loan repayment.” International Year of Microcredit 2005, supra note 126. “In these 
cases, grants, infrastructure improvements or education and training programmes are 
more effective.” Id. 
237 My uncle, a farmer in rural India, did precisely this when he received a small cam-
era as a present from my mother. As a result, he was able to generate a proªt regularly. 
238 Taylor, supra note 128, at 318. This practice was originally launched by Grameen 
Telecom. Id. The United Nations International Year of Microcredit recounts a similar 
story: 
Fatima Serwoni lives in the village of Namunsi in Uganda and runs a small 
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has consistently paid the school fees for her four children. With her most re-
cent loan, Fatima purchased a mobile phone kit to start a payphone business, 
becoming one of the ªrst “village phone operators” of MTN villagePhone, an 
initiative of Grameen Foundation USA and MTN Uganda. Undeterred by the 
lack of electricity in her village, Fatima uses a car battery to charge her 
phone. With the nearest public payphone more than four kilometres away, 
people in Fatima’s community are happy to have convenient and affordable 
telephone access for the ªrst time. Fatima is pleased with her new business, 
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Other examples of microloan-funded enterprises include the creation 
of a noodle business with a twenty-ªve dollar loan, and a ºoral land-
scaping and resale businesses with a similar loan.239 Even where the 
funded activity does not directly impact water resources, as in the ex-
amples above, it ultimately improves water management because it 
reduces the need to place short-term survival above long-term preser-
vation of water resources.240
 Some microloan-funded projects, however, do have a direct im-
pact on water resource use and management.241 For example, a 
woman could borrow enough money to build a cart capable of trans-
porting water for several families. She could then create a business 
out of providing water to other women who would ordinarily have to 
fetch the water themselves. Those women, in turn, would have more 
time to engage in other income-generating activities or to pursue 
education. Microloans could also be used to fund “micro-irrigation”— 
irrigation of small plots.242 For instance, a small-scale bucket irriga-
tion kit can be purchased with a microloan of ten dollars.243 The kit 
consists of a bucket and two lengths of drip tape.244 The irrigation 
provided is suitable for kitchen gardens, allowing individuals—most 
likely women—to sell small amounts of crop.245 This irrigation system 
is also scalable, allowing for irrigation of larger plots of land.246 While 
the concept might appear simplistic, the bucket kit is currently dis-
tributed in over one hundred countries, and makes signiªcant contri-
butions to individual livelihoods.247 In light of the direct and indirect 
beneªcial impacts microloans can have on environmental resource 
use, the international environmental community should look to mi-
croloans to supplement existing environmental projects. 
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C. Microcredit: A Tool to Improve Water Resource Management 
 Environmental degradation in the developing world results in part 
from short-term survival needs preventing efforts to engage in long-
term resource protection.248 As discussed above, microloans may be 
used as a tool to alleviate poverty, thereby reducing the need to place 
short-term survival over long-term resource protection.249 In addition, 
microloans can be used to directly discourage environmentally harmful 
activities and promote sustainable uses of water resources. 
 One way in which microloans can beneªt the environment gen-
erally, and water resources particularly, is by promoting more equita-
ble and sustainable uses of land.250 By using microloans to fund the 
small-scale irrigation methods proposed by Blank and his col-
leagues—such as using bucket kits251—one can obtain high productiv-
ity from small plots while reducing reliance on large scale irrigation 
schemes that beneªt only a small minority.252 Reduced reliance also 
has the potential to discourage unsustainable land-conversion prac-
tices, which create an incentive for “[o]ver-exploitation of water for 
irrigation and the intensiªcation of agriculture.”253 Land conversion 
is harmful to ecosystems and threatens the availability and quality of 
water resources because it ªlls water bodies with silt, inhibits natural 
recharge, and eliminates natural ºood control and key components 
of the aquatic environment, such as habitats for ªsheries and water-
fowl.254
 In addition to discouraging harmful land conversion, microloans 
can play an integral role in reducing water consumption for irriga-
tion.255 Small-scale irrigation projects, funded with microloans, or a 
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combination of microloans and microgrants, can reduce water con-
sumption by promoting high productivity from small plots256 and dis-
couraging potentially wasteful large-scale damming and irrigation.257 
Small-scale irrigation projects can also be combined with microloan-
funded seed-buying programs to promote the planting of crops that 
use relatively little water.258
 Microloans can also have a direct beneªcial impact on the envi-
ronment by discouraging deforestation activities. Deforestation is es-
pecially pronounced where wood or wood-derived coal is used for en-
ergy consumption; one signiªcant use of wood in this context is for 
cooking fuel.259 This deforestation, in turn, directly and adversely af-
fects water resources because “the continued availability of water de-
pends on the conservation of forests and the use of soil and water 
conservation technologies in people’s farms. As woodland areas are 
cleared for cultivation . . . less water permeates the ground, and more 
is diverted away from the groundwater store as run-off.”260 
Signiªcantly, wood-derived coal use for cooking is inefªcient in its use 
of time, energy, and ªnances.261
 One can hypothesize that a microloan program, in conjunction 
with other forms of funding, could be used to intervene in this cycle 
                                                                                                                      
256 Blank et al., supra note 149, at 3. 
257 See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
258 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 2, at 121 (discussing the problems of “seemingly 
more efªcient high-yielding crop varietals that demand much more water than traditional 
crops”). This could also be combined with programs to discourage overfarming. For ex-
ample, increased education and awareness about the harms of overfarming—perhaps 
funded by microgrant—combined with alternative livelihood opportunities—funded by 
microloan—can encourage crop rotation and other sustainable farming activities. 
259 See Jacqueline Sims, World Health Org., Anthology on Women, Health and 
Environment 83 (1994), available at http://www.who.int/docstore/peh/archives/women/ 
women_health_and_environment.htm (follow “Domestic Fuel Shortage and Indoor Air Pol-
lution” hyperlink). 
260 Huggins, supra note 159, at 10. 
261 Sims, supra note 259, at 85. 
Because they cannot afford the kind of stoves needed to burn more efªcient 
fuels, the poor continue to rely on woodfuels even though their cost is as high 
or higher than kerosene, gas or electricity [even for the urban poor]. Ofªcial 
subsidies often favour modern fuels, overlooking the inability of the poor to 
either switch to a modern fuel or support the costs of tradional [sic] fuels. 
Measures are therefore urgently needed to enable poor urban households to 
meet their minimum basic energy needs. 
Id. Women also expend signiªcant amounts of time collecting woodfuels, which are less 
energy efªcient than modern fuels. See id. at 83–84. Additionally, women are more likely to 
suffer from upper-respiratory distress when cooking with woodfuels due to kitchen smoke. 
See id. at 98–100. 
2006] Microfinancing Water Use Development Aid 483 
of environmental degradation. First, microgrants could be used to 
create facilities producing alternative biomass fuels, train individuals 
to produce fuel briquettes from sawdust and wastepaper, and help 
individuals overcome the costs associated with converting to a differ-
ent type of fuel.262 Second, microloans could be used to discourage 
deforestation by providing alternative livelihood opportunities for 
those who would otherwise cut down trees and resell the lumber or 
wood-derived coal.263 Microloans can also help stimulate economic 
activity, such as the creation of a food-vending business, that is en-
abled by the availability of lower-cost, reliable fuel in the form of bio-
mass briquettes.264 Third, a microloan program could fund enter-
prises involved in the distribution of various alternative cooking fuels, 
such as solar cooking and fuels derived from agricultural waste.265 Al-
though it is currently unaffordable to fund highly localized alternative 
biomass briquette production plants, microloans could be used to 
fund a transportation enterprise for individuals to transport alterna-
tive biomass briquettes from a point of distribution to a village or 
town.266 In these ways, microloans can play an important role in creat-
ing the new ethic of environmental stewardship necessary for long-
term ecosystem preservation.267
Conclusion 
 Effective management of transboundary water resources is cru-
cial for the Nile riparian states, both for economic development and 
for national security. Failures of governance and problems of unequal 
representation, however, preclude the possibility that all vital domestic 
interests will be adequately addressed in the basin-wide dialogue on 
                                                                                                                      
262 See U.N. Dev. Programme, Generating Opportunities: Case Studies on Energy 
and Women at 53–60, U.N. Sales no. E.00.III.B.2 (Salome Mixana & Gail V. Karlsson, eds., 
2001) (discussing implementation of biomass briquette program in Malawi), available at 
http://www.undp.org/energy/publications/2001/ªles_2001a/Generating_opp_full.pdf. 
263 See id. (discussing how making biomass briquettes was and income-generating activ-
ity for women in Malawi). 
264 See id. at 21. 
265 See David Herring, Power to the People: How Satelite Data Help Us Exploit Nature’s Renew-
able Energy Resources, Earth Observatory 4, http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Study/Re- 
newableEnergy/printall.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2006) (describing efforts to make solar 
ovens available in the developing world); Mass. Inst. of Tech., D-Lab Project Portfolio, 
Sugarcane Charcoal, http://web.mit.edu/d-lab/portfolio/sugarcanecharcoal.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 22, 2006) (describing the technology necessary for converting sugarcane waste 
into charcoal briquettes). 
266 See U.N. Dev. Programme, supra note 262. 
267 WWDR, supra note 254, at 130. 
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transboundary cooperation. Although state-level action is a necessary 
component of international water management, community-level ac-
tion is equally vital for achieving sustainable and equitable water use. 
This is due in large part to the fact that water is deeply connected to 
domestic social, economic, and cultural structures. 
 Where the relationship between poverty eradication and envi-
ronmental protection has been recognized, it has rarely been trans-
lated into concrete implementation. The creation of NBI is a historic 
step in achieving cooperation over the Nile’s water and ameliorating 
the causes and effects of water scarcity in the Nile Basin. NBI cur-
rently recognizes the need for community-level action, in particular 
through Nile TEAP and Nile TMP. 
 Microcredit programs are successfully implemented for purposes 
of poverty eradication throughout the developing world, including 
the Nile riparian states. However, microcredit programs do not play a 
central role in achieving environmental goals. The Nile Basin is one 
of the most complex and strained shared river basins in the world. 
Given the combination of developmental and environmental needs in 
the region, a full cooperative scheme requires inclusion of microloans 
together with existing approaches to cooperation. Microloans can 
provide dramatic beneªts in conjunction with international environ-
mental efforts, especially in the Nile Basin. 
 By implementing a microcredit program in conjunction with 
other community-level NBI initiatives, the international community 
can end the vicious cycle of poverty and marginalization. As part of an 
international program for the management of the Nile’s water, a mi-
croloan program with an environmental focus has the potential to 
pull people out of poverty and alleviate stress on the environment due 
to an inability to achieve efªcient and environmentally friendly prac-
tices. The Nile riparian states stand to gain a great deal by willingly 
including microªnance among the tools used at the community level. 
